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Abstract Contrary to the views of some libertarians, “libertarian
paternalism” is not an oxymoron. But are its twomost prominent
advocates, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, really libertarian
paternalists or are they paternalists in sheep’s clothing? Thaler
seems to be somewhat of a libertarian paternalist whereas
Sunstein appears to be more of a straight coercive paternalist.
But even Thaler passes up major chances to advocate reducing
straight paternalism by making it more libertarian. Those who
favor freedom should not reject the concept of libertarian pater-
nalism altogether. Instead they should apply the concept more
consistently than Thaler and Sunstein have doneand use it to
push for a less coercive government. Indeed, the fact that gov-
ernment officials who plan our lives also have human foibles
argues for less government, not true.
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In the last few years, two academics, University of Chicago
economist Richard H. Thaler and Harvard University law pro-
fessor Cass R. Sunstein, have made a case for what they call
“libertarian paternalism.” At first glance the term seems like an
oxymoron. After all, the term “libertarian” is generally taken to
refer to a philosophy in which each person’s freedom tomake his
non-coercive and non-fraudulent choices is not forcefully re-
strained by others. “Paternalism” is generally taken to mean that
someone in charge ismaking choices for others, sometimes using
coercion. But an article that Thaler and Sunstein wrote in the
American Economic Review1 had persuaded me that it isn’t
necessarily an oxymoron. I’ll say more on that below.
The big question that libertarian paternalism raises is not
whether such an idea is plausible. The big question is: how is it
used? Are its most prominent advocates really libertarian
paternalists or are they paternalists in sheep’s clothing? My
answer is that Thaler seems to be somewhat of a libertarian
paternalist whereas Sunstein appears to be more of a straight
coercive paternalist. But even Thaler passes up major chances to
advocate reducing straight paternalism by making it more liber-
tarian. That leads to another question: Should those who favor
freedom reject the concept of libertarian paternalism altogether or
should they, rather, take the offensive and use the Thaler/Sunstein
(henceforth, TS) framework to do what TS should have done:
Use the concepts that TS have used to push for a less coercive
government. I argue for the latter.
The Nature of Humans
Why do TS advocate libertarian paternalism, rather than just
libertarianism, in the first place? The reason has to do with the
nature of humans and what is now called “behavioral eco-
nomics.”Of course all economics is about behavior, a fact that
makes the term amisnomer. But what behavioral economics is
about is the limited capacity humans have for making rational
decisions. In the first five chapters of their book, Nudge,2 TS
lay out the difference between their model of humans, whom
they call “Humans,” and the economists’ model of humans,
whom they call “Econs.”
Whereas Econs evaluate every situation, judging costs and
benefits, and quickly and accurately calculating probabilities,
“Humans” look for rules of thumb. Rules of thumb substitute
for thinking, which means that they save time and mental
effort—effort that most people find daunting or simply would
rather not exert because it’s not fun or because there are better
things to do. The problem is, write TS, that sometimes these
rules of thumb cause us to make very bad decisions. They
highlight three rules of thumb: anchoring, availability, and
representativeness. I’ll highlight two, anchoring and availabil-
ity. First, anchoring. Imagine that you’re asked to estimate the
2 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2008.
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population of Milwaukee. Let’s say you live in Chicago and
you know that Chicago has about three million people and that
Milwaukee is smaller. Three million becomes your anchor and
you estimate down to, say, one million. But if you live in
Green Bay, population 100,000, and you know that
Milwaukee is substantially bigger, you might estimate
300,000. Green Bay’s population is your anchor. The Green
Bay resident estimates low because of his anchor, and the
Chicagoan estimates high because of his anchor (Milwaukee’s
population is 599,000.)
Availability has to do with ready examples that come to mind.
Consider the case of homicides versus suicides. Examples of
homicides are more “available” than those of suicides.
Homicides are typically reported in newspapers whereas suicides
often go unreported. The result is that many people think that
homicides aremore frequent than suicides. In fact, the opposite is
the case. Or take terrorism. Virtually everyone in the United
States over about age 19 knows about 9/11, and the “availability”
of this example of terrorism causes people to dramatically over-
estimate the probability of another terrorist attack.3
Implications for Employers’ Policies
What does the above have to do with libertarian paternalism?
TS go from this reasoning about Humans and Econs to how
subtle differences in various institutions can cause enormous
differences in behavior. Enter the “nudge.” Their idea is that
various players—employers and governments, mainly—
should nudge people in the direction of “good” choices while
letting them, if they wish, opt out at a low cost. They call this
“choice architecture.”
Consider one of their examples: the decision to enroll in
your employer’s 401-k or 403-b plan. Most employers do not
automatically enroll you. To be enrolled, you typically must
fill out a form. So not being enrolled is the “default option.”
But it doesn’t have to be that way. The default option could be
for the employer to enroll you for the minimum percent of
your pay that gets you the maximum of your employer’s
matching payment. Then, if you want not to be enrolled, you
can get out. If all people were Econs, there would be virtually
no difference between outcomes under these two options. The
small cost of filling out a form to enroll or to disenroll would
be rounding error compared to the costs and benefits of being
in or out. So the choice of default options should not matter.
But it matters crucially. TS tell of a study4 in which under the
opt-in approach at one firm, only 20 % joined at first, and this
number rose to 65 % after 36 months. But when the firm
switched to automatic enrollment, enrollment of new em-
ployees jumped to 90 % and rose to 98 % within 36 months.
As an Econ, I must admit that this is strong evidence that most
people are Humans, not Econs. Notice also that a firm that
chooses the automatic enrollment option is engaging in purely
libertarian paternalism: it is not using force and the govern-
ment is not involved.
TS praise a 2006 law, the Pension Protection Act, which
gives employers a small incentive to choose the automatic
enrollment option. The Act enables employers to avoid an
annoying regulation that had already existed. This is clearly a
move in a libertarian direction. It would have been problem-
atic if the law imposed a new regulation and let employers out
of it only by choosing automatic enrollment.
Moving Toward More Libertarian Government Policy
If TS are really libertarian paternalists and not just paternalists,
do they advocate changes to make existing paternalist govern-
ment policies less oppressive? If so, then they are credible. If
not, then they are probably coming up with one more tiresome
rationale for making government our parent, albeit a particular-
ly sadistic parent who keeps trying to throw us in prison.
The good news is that in their co-authored book, Nudge,
many of the policies they advocate would reduce government
oppression. In the areas of motorcycle helmet laws, school
choice, medical malpractice, and marriage, their proposals
would retain some government oppression, while moving us
in a more-libertarian direction.
On motorcycle helmet laws, they approvingly cite New
York Times columnist John Tierney’s proposal that people be
allowed to go without helmets if they take an extra driving
course and submit proof of health insurance. Again, this is a
move away from the crushing paternalism most state govern-
ments impose by banning choice altogether.
Another important move away from the current straight pa-
ternalism that they advocate is on the issue of medical malprac-
tice. They point out that patients now cannot sign a legally
enforceable contract in which they promise not to sue for mal-
practice. The result is what the authors call a “forced lottery
ticket.” Courts are capricious in these cases, finding negligence
where there isn’t any andmissing negligencewhere it exists. And
the lottery ticket isn’t cheap: they cite estimates that exposure to
medical liability accounts for 5 to 9 % of hospital expenditures,
which gets reflected in higher premiums for health insurance.
Why do courts block the kind of contracts that TS claim that
patients would want? They write: “The answer is nonlibertarian
paternalism, pure and simple.” They advocate letting patients, or
their employers who buy the insurance, have an option that
forbids malpractice suits. The nudge to get people to give up
their lottery ticket is a default optionwhereby the patient gives up
3 For a numerate look at the small risk posed by terrorism, see John
Mueller, “A False Sense of Insecurity,” Regulation, Fall 2004, Vol. 27,
No. 3: 42–46.
4 Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. Shea, “The Power of Suggestion:
Intertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior,”Quarterly Journal
of Economics 116 (2001): 1149–1225.
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his right. Interestingly, the nudge here is not a big part of their
proposal. What they advocate—letting people contract out of the
right to sue—has been advocated for many years by many
libertarians, with or without a nudge.
In a chapter titled “Privatizing Marriage,” TS advocate, quite
sensibly, moving in a libertarian direction on marriage by sepa-
rating marriage and the state. They point out that, despite the
evidence, almost 100 % of people who get married think that
they are highly unlikely to get divorced. This is one of those
systematic, but wrong, biases that people have. People also think
that arranging pre-nuptial agreements will “spoil the mood.” The
result? Most people are vulnerable to “a legal system that has an
astonishing degree of uncertainty.” TS advocate a nudge: a
default contract that helps the weakest parties, typically women.
Then, people would be free to avoid the default by tailoring a
contract to their desires. They also suggest that taking marriage
away from the state would, with one fell swoop, solve the thorny
problem of gay marriage. Let churches and other organizations
choose whatever marriages they want to approve and let people
choose their churches. Interestingly, their nudge is a small part of
this proposal, just as with their proposal on malpractice.
Keeping Paternalism
If there were ever a case of the government substantially
intruding in people’s lives because government officials think
that otherwise those people will not make good choices for
themselves, it is Social Security. Currently, the government
funds Social Security by taking 6.2 % of pay from employer
and employee each, on pay up to an annual amount of
$113,700.5 For people with income at or above this
$113,700 cap, the Social Security tax amounts to a hefty
$7,049.40 on employer and employee each. For the vast
majority of working Americans, the combined employer and
employee tax is substantially above the amount of federal
income tax they pay. Clearly, this is a large paternalistic
program. Because the Social Security program is the largest
single expenditure item in the federal government’s budget,
exceeding even spending on national defense, one could rea-
sonably argue that Social Security is the largest paternalistic
program that the federal government runs.
If TS strongly believe in the libertarian part of libertarian
paternalism, they should advocate letting people out of Social
Security as long as those let out can show that they will save
an equivalent amount in a private pension plan. Interestingly,
in the 1930s, whenCongress was debating FDR’s proposal for
Social Security, the U.S. Senate voted 51 to 35 for an amend-
ment by Senator Bennett Champ Clark ofMissouri that would
have exempted employers and employees who had
government-approved pension plans. Unfortunately, the
amendment was later removed.
So what do TS advocate as a reform for Social Security?
Although they address Social Security, they do not address
any reforms other than changes in taxes and benefits.
However, Richard Thaler did address Social Security fur-
ther in an e-mail discussion I had with him in 2008, at the time
Nudgewas coming out. When I asked him about this issue, he
replied: “for SS [Social Security] current old people have
property rights (which we libertarians respect) and if you let
young and rich people opt out who pays?”
To Thaler’s claim, there are two responses. First, the elderly
do not have property rights, either as a matter of ethics or as a
matter of Constitutional law. On the ethics, the elderly have no
right to have the government forcibly take money from youn-
ger strangers who never consented to the deal and who, in fact,
were not even born when the deal was made. Someone can
never have a property right to forcibly take the property of
someone else who obtained the property justly. If one can, I
want Thaler’s house. Second, on the matter of Constitutional
law, the Supreme Court made clear in its Flemming v. Nestor
decision, that, despite all the government’s propaganda about
Social Security being insurance, it is not: Social Security is a
gigantic tax-and-subsidy scheme. Interestingly, TS them-
selves point out in Nudge that Congress is entitled to change
“its” mind and that “the Constitution does not protect your
right to Social Security benefits.” Thaler seems confused: on
the one hand, he claimed, in his e-mail discussion with me,
that the elderly have a property right in Social Security and on
the other hand, he and Sunstein say that this “right” is not
protected. Which is it?
Moreover, even if, by some stretch, old people did have a
property right, why should the government single out young
people to honor it? If the government is to honor it, shouldn’t it
go after the people who made the commitment? One way is to
attach all the property of all the Congressmen and Presidents
who have ever voted for or signed a law to increase Social
Security payments. This might sound extreme—no, this is
extreme—and it would generate only a small fraction of the
revenue required. But is it less just than having the government
go after the future earnings of innocent 2-year-olds?
Another issue onwhich TS are silent—and should not be—
is the issue of income tax withholding. The U.S. federal
government moved to withholding during World War II be-
cause that was when it changed the income tax from a “class
tax”—that is, a tax on high-income people—to the “mass
tax”—that is, a tax on all but very low-income people.
Afraid that people would be faced with a huge tax bill if they
were required to pay their taxes annually or quarterly, the
federal government implemented an “installment plan,” re-
quiring employers to withhold taxes from their employees’
paychecks. I remember having a discussion about this in the
late 1970s with Thaler, when he and I were both young
5 See “Federal Insurance Contributions Act Tax,” http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Federal_Insurance_Contributions_Act_tax
270 Soc (2014) 51:268–273
assistant professors at the University of Rochester. We both
noted that, because of withholding, many people do not seem
aware of howmuch they really pay in income taxes and that, if
they get a big refund, they think they are not paying much.
This is the kind of bias that, in other contexts, TS decry. They
seem to want people to be aware of the real cost of various
things and not to under- or over-estimate. So a straightforward
way to do that with taxes is to end withholding. If people were
required to pay taxes on an annual or quarterly basis, they,
especially high-income people, would become more aware of
the cost of government and would likely estimate it to be
higher than they now think it is. The result would likely be
more resistance to government expansion. It’s pretty clear that
libertarians would like this outcome. And, given TS’s basis for
libertarian paternalism—people’s systematic tendency to mis-
estimate based on readily available data—and their alleged
libertarianism, they should like both the process that leads to
the result—namely, people having better information—and
the result itself. Yet they say not a word about tax withholding.
Expanding Paternalism: From Nudge to Iron Fist
I noted earlier that Thaler seems to be more libertarian than
Sunstein. My evidence for that is Sunstein’s latest book,
Simpler: The Future of Government.6 In at least three in-
stances in that book, Sunstein crosses the line from advocating
nudges to advocating outright old-fashioned coercion: price
controls, restrictions on the size of soda containers, and graph-
ic warnings about smoking.
Take price controls. In a discussion in which he makes the
case for disclosure requirements, he touts disclosure require-
ments for health insurance companies. His case for disclosure
is that it allows consumers to know more about what they are
buying. That sounds reasonably sensible. But then Sunstein
writes:“The Affordable Care Act also enlists disclosure to
constrain increases in health insurance premiums. The act
requires the secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and the states to establish a process
for the annual review of ‘unreasonable increases’ in pre-
miums. That process in turn requires health insurance issuers
to justify any apparently unreasonable increase before it can
be implemented.”7 In other words, Sunstein is not advocating
simple disclosure. Instead, he advocates price controls.
Sunstein, who is obviously economically literate, does not
seem to feel the need to justify price controls, despite the fact
that opposition to price controls and the distortions they cause
is one of the things on which the vast majority of economists
agree.
Or consider New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg’s
move in 2012 to limit the size of soda containers to 16 oz.
Sunstein points out an obvious fact: that the limit would not
have allowed people to choose a larger size. Yet, in discussing
comedian Jon Stewart’s negative reaction to Bloomberg’s ban
on larger containers, Sunstein writes, “Stewart is capturing a
pervasive and general skepticism about paternalism in general
and nudges in particular.”8 Here, Sunstein himself is incoher-
ent. As he had admitted a few lines earlier, Bloomberg’s
regulation was a ban, not a nudge. Sunstein might argue that
it is a nudge because one can always buy multiple containers.
But that is costly. Moreover, what if someone wants 20 oz of a
soda? It is hard to buy a 4-oz drink. Sunstein seems to be
illustrating precisely what many libertarian critics had feared:
Sunstein, one of the primary advocates of nudges and liber-
tarian paternalism, seems quite comfortable with old-
fashioned coercive paternalism.
Finally, consider the graphic warnings that the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) wants to require on cigarette
packs. Such warnings include disgusting pictures of people
with bad health due to smoking. Sunstein claims that such
warnings “are a distinctive kind of nudge.” “However graph-
ic,” he writes, “the warnings maintain freedom of choice.”9 It
is true that, with the graphic warnings in place, people would
still be able to choose to buy cigarettes. But more than one
choice is involved. Another choice is the kind of package in
which people buy their cigarettes. The FDA regulation that
Sunstein supports would substantially limit people’s choices.
Call it a hunch,10 but I think most smokers would rather not
buy their cigarettes in such packages. My guess is that the
reason Sunstein is oblivious to that lack of choice is that he is
not in the market for cigarettes. I wonder how he would feel if,
when he ordered a fattening dessert in a fancy restaurant, the
server were required to serve it with pictures of people who are
in poor health because of overeating such desserts.
Moreover, whether the issue is cigarettes, cars, drugs, or
any other good, Sunstein consistently puts a zero weight on
the freedom of producers. In discussing the various examples
he cites, Sunstein devotes not a sentence of concern for their
freedom—or lack of. His indifference to producers’ freedom
becomes explicit in his discussion of regulations on advertis-
ing airline fees. In 2011, notes Sunstein, the Department of
Transportation introduced a regulation to require “airlines to
disclose prominently all potential fees on their web sites.”11
“Even better,” he writes, “airlines have to include all govern-
ment taxes and fees in every advertised price.” Sunstein notes
that some airlines sued to invalidate the regulation,
6 Cass R. Sunstein. Simpler: The Future of Government. New York:
Simon & Schuster. 2013.
7 Simpler, p. 92.
8 Simpler, p. 191.
9 Simpler, p. 132.
10 Actually, it is more than a hunch. When I visit Canada every summer,
where the government requires such graphic warnings, my smoking
friends tell me that they no not like the packages.
11 Simpler, p. 90.
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“complaining especially about the requirement to include
taxes and fees and invoking the First Amendment, no less,
to say that the requirement was unconstitutional.”Here’s what
he does not disclose: the airlines that sued, in Spirit Airlines,
Inc. v. Department of Transportation, wanted to be able to
state the government taxes on the ticket in a font as big as the
font on the overall price. But the regulation prohibits them
from doing so. So passengers won’t be as aware of the
government’s role in high airfares as of the fares themselves.
That sounds like a First Amendment case to me. You would
think that Sunstein would understand that. After all, his book
is a commercial product and he left out this important piece of
information. In that sense, he’s like an airline that leaves out
information about high baggage fees. Yet I bet he would
object to a law requiring him to tell the reader the whole story.
To his credit, he earlier rejected his own tentative proposal for
a “fairness doctrine” for the Internet; he had toyed with the
idea of legally requiring bloggers to link to contrary views.12
That Sunstein even seriously thought of that idea, though,
suggests that on the issue of free speech, he has a tin ear.
It also shows something else. Again, he had the chance, as
in the case of tax withholding, to make a case for making
people aware of the true cost of government. But the DOT
regulation he defends forces airlines to make the true cost of
government less noticeable. Even if Sunstein has no commit-
ment to freedom of speech, he should be arguing for allowing
consumer/voter awareness, not for suppressing it.
I used to think that some of my libertarian friends and
colleagues exaggerated in their criticisms of “libertarian pa-
ternalism” in the hands of Thaler and Sunstein. But Sunstein’s
book, Simpler, has brought me much closer to their conclu-
sion. GeorgeMason University economist Don Boudreaux, in
addressing New York Times columnist David Brooks’s claim
that one need not worry much about “nudges” by government
turning into “diktats,” said it best:
“One reason why the empirical record isn’t more full of
nudges turning into diktats is that government typically issues
diktats from the get-go. We Americans were commanded,
without any prior ‘nudging,’ to use low-flow faucets.We were
commanded, without prior ‘nudging,’ not to use marijuana.
We were commanded, without prior ‘nudging,’ to set aside a
portion of our earnings into Social Security. Ditto, of course,
for countless other aspects of our lives—including being
commanded by Obamacare, without prior ‘nudging,’ to buy
health insurance as designed by government officials.”13
So the only way that TS can really establish their “libertar-
ian cred” is by going the opposite way: disowning the heavily
coercive policies they, and especially Sunstein, advocate and
pushing further, as they did somewhat in Nudge, for moves
from straight paternalism to actual “libertarian paternalism.”
But should we wait for them? If we do, I fear we will wait a
long time. Instead, we should be using their arguments and
following them to their logical conclusion. They are right
about people’s limited capacity for good decision-making.
So one reasonable step is to let people out of the most coercive
government programs—and there are many to choose from—
if they demonstrate awareness of the issues. I remember
talking to a young man who had just earned his first pay
statement and noticed the letters “FICA”14 above the biggest
amount withheld. When I told him what it was, he was
incensed. “Can’t I go to the Social Security office and explain
to them that I am responsible and that, if they agree not to take
the amount out, I will put that amount into my savings?” I had
to tell him no, even though his idea made perfect sense. But
that young man should have been able to opt out.
My fellow blogger, Bryan Caplan, advocates an even more
radical solution, for Social Security and for other government
programs, that takes account of the insights of the behavioral
economists. He writes: “Instead of requiring everyone to pay
Social Security taxes to provide for their retirement, we should
allow people to opt out of the system if they write a one-page
essay explaining why they prefer to handle their retirement on
their own. Analogous opt-out rules should be devised for
government health care programs, worker protection laws,
consumer protection laws, and so on.” Of course, you might
want to tweak these proposals a tad. But if you really believe
in the effectiveness of “nudging,” such policies deserve seri-
ous consideration.15
The Invisible Gorilla
Libertarians are also particularly well situated to take the TS
thinking in a new direction where TS seem to fear to tread:
applying the insights of behavioral economics to a particu-
larly powerful group of people, namely, government
officials.
Let me explain. In a fascinating chapter, “Invisible Gorillas
and Human Herds,”16 Sunstein tells about an experiment in
which people who were asked to watch a video and count
basketball passes totally missed seeing a gorilla in the midst of
the players. The lesson for businesses, individuals, and gov-
ernments is, he writes, “that we are all at risk of missing a lot
12 “Cass Sunstein once considered a “Fairness Doctrine” of sorts for the
Internet, but then thought better of it.” Politifact.com, April 27, 2009.
Available at: http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2009/
may/05/chain-email/cass-sunstein-once-considered-fairnes-doctrine-sor/
13 Don Boudreaux, “Stop Nudging Me,” Café Hayek, August 9, 2013.
Available at: http://cafehayek.com/2013/08/stop-nudging-me.html
14 FICA, of course, stands for Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the
law under which Social Security taxes are collected.
15 Bryan Caplan, “Nudge, Policy, and the Endowment Affect,” Econlog,
July 31, 2013. Available at: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2013/07/
nudge_policy_an.html
16 Simpler, pp. 127–146.
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that is happening in the background (and possibly even the
foreground) of our lives.” Indeed.
That brings me to the 800-lb gorilla in the room—gov-
ernment—and a large irony in Simpler that Sunstein seems
unaware of. In one passage, he notes that he delayed getting
vaccinated for H1N1. Why do I highlight that fact? Because
I would argue that it illustrates a fundamental contradiction.
Sunstein’s delay shows that even he is subject to the think-
ing that he wants the government to “nudge,” or outright
coerce, us out of. He even admits, just four pages earlier,
that for many people, “including those who work in gov-
ernment, what may matter most is today, tomorrow, and next
week.” Yet, he wants us to trust these selfsame government
officials to make major decisions—about drugs, medical
care, cars, and cigarettes, to name only a few—for us. If
those government officials can’t be trusted to take the long
view when their own wellbeing is at stake, why would
Sunstein think that we can trust them to do so for a nation
of strangers?
The very insights that TS have about human behavior
apply even more strongly to the humans in government be-
cause, besides being human and having the limits that regular
humans have, they have even less incentive than average
people have to make good decisions about their lives. If
something in our lives goes wrong, even badly wrong, due
to a government official’s decision, the government official
typically bears very little cost for that bad decision. That
explains why government so often makes bad decisions.
Interestingly, one early pioneer in behavioral economics,
although he did not use term “behavioral economics,” is the
late Friedrich Hayek. In 1960, Hayek wrote: “[A]ll men in
pursuit of immediate aims are apt—or, because of the limita-
tion of their intellect, in fact bound—to violate rules of con-
duct which they would nevertheless wish to see generally
observed. Because of the restricted capacity of our minds,
our immediate purposes will always loom large, and we will
tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to them. In individual
as in social conduct we can therefore approach a measure of
rationality or consistency in making particular decisions only
by submitting to general principles, irrespective of momentary
needs. Legislation can no more dispense with guidance by
principles than any other human activity if it is to take account
of effects in the aggregate.”17 Significantly, as Don
Boudreaux notes,18 this passage appears in a discussion of
the U.S. Constitution. Hayek understood, even then, that the
very limits of our rationality argue for not having government
have a big role in our private lives.
David R. Henderson is an associate professor of economics at the
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California; a research fellow with Stanford
University’s Hoover Institution; and a Senior Fellow with the Fraser
Institute in Vancouver, Canada. The thoughts here are his own and not
necessarily those of the institutions with which he is affiliated. This article
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17 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1960, p. 179.
18 Don Boudreaux, “F.A. ‘Kahneman’ Hayek,” Café Hayek, September
28, 2013. Available at: http://cafehayek.com/2013/09/f-a-kahneman-
hayek.html
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